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RESTRICTED 
Area constituted the greatest assembly of Naval might the world 
has ever seen or may ever see again-far greater than the strength 
which the Japanese Navy could muster in that area. And yet, mark 
you, there was no effective single command agency which could 
weld all of our Naval Forces into a single fleet under a single com­
mand; Admiral Nimitz did not have that authority, nor did Gen­
eral MacArthur; and no higher echelon could or would step into 
the breach. The details of the second battle of the Philippine Sea 
will keep you, and the student generations to �ollow you, occupied 
for decades to come. Obviously, there were many things done which 
could have been done differently in the light of hindsight; obviously, 
there were things left undone which could have been undertaken 
to great advantage. But to me, in retrospect, the vital and important 
thing is that, although not unified under a single authoritative 
command, all of those separated commanders were thinking in 
sufficiently like terms to construct a mosaic of tactical victories .fit­
ting together ino a greater mural of strategic victory which effect­
ively terminated Japanese sea power. There were gaps in commun­
ications and gaps in mutual understandings among the commanders, 
but the great principles of sea-power had been inculcated in all of 
those commanders and were literally second nature to them, so 
that even without auth�ritative coordinating command, they in­
stinctively moved in directions which were basically sound. Some 
critics have said that disaster was narrowly averted - we can not 
conceed that: the "ifs" of the critics are too improbable if one un­
derstands the profound basic indoctrination that actuated Admiral 
Nimitz, Admiral Halsey, Admiral Kinkaia, Admiral Oldendorf, Ad­
miral Lockwood, and all of those who derived their own tasks and 
/. 
. ) 
contributed their own parts to the over;.all victory. The War College 
played an important part in .that indoctrination-and the War 
College must continue to exercise leadership in channelling Navy 
thinking along indoctrinated lines which will meet tomorrow's 
innovations and complexities. 
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RESTRICTED 
I have stressed certain mental attributes and emphasized 
sound indoctrination, because without them the achievement of good 
logistical planning is impossible. 
Your reading will have highlighted the evolution of logistical 
planning prior to World War II and during the war years, and you 
are aware of the evolutionary gropings that characterized the per­
iod immediately following the beginning of hostilties. I shall there­
fore waste no time on the past, but will sketch a vignette of the 
Washington Logistics Workshop as it is today in the year one of 
unification. 
Let me say first, that the title of my discussion today­
Logistical Planning for War-is not merely academic; regardless 
of the strivings of men of good will, powerful national pressures 
are still being exerted in furtherance of national policies; nations 
still seek and use coercive devices for imposing their national wills 
upon others. Even the most hopeful .and altruistic person must • 
realize that we are being pressured from witho-qt and within, by 
, unpeaceful methods, to bend our will to conform to other views; 
this pressuring, so far, has not involved shooting or the overt use of 
force, but we are sitting on a powder keg which could be ignited 
by a careless spark. The recent Governmental and Congressional 
Record of Action is prima-facie evidence that the nation recognizes 
the danger of war and is. strengthening its defenses. Therefore, · I 
say that the logistical planning which we are doing today is in every 
sense logistical planning against the tragic contingency of war, · 
even while it is our earnest hope that diplomacy, firmness, and our 
latent power may serve as deterrents to another holocaust. 
The genesis of our security thinking and the sequence of 
planning events are, although altered in the detail by unification, 
essentially the sa,me as in former years: national objectives are 
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